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Friedman, Norman. Network-centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter through Three Wars.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 424pp. $32.95
Norman Friedman’s latest book,
Network-centric Warfare, should find a
place on the shelves of all students of
naval warfare. It provides a wealth of
insights into contemporary and future
wars, by focusing on networks—the
connection between weapons and sys-
tems, the front line and the rear eche-
lon, decision makers and analysts, and
domains of warfare from land to sea to
air to space to cyberspace. Friedman’s
central thesis is that network-centric
warfare (NWCW) as articulated by ad-
vocates like the late vice admiral and
former Naval War College president
Arthur Cebrowski is really “picture-
centric warfare”—that is, as he explains,
warfare is “based on using a more or
less real time picture of what is happen-
ing.” Friedman then demonstrates the
evolution of picture-centric/network-
centric warfare by examining naval pro-
grams from British admiral Sir John
Fisher’s Mediterranean surveillance
program at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century to the sound surveillance
system (SOSUS) in the latter half of
that century.
Whether one agrees with Friedman or
not, his account challenges many past
and current conceptions of warfare and
represents a frontal challenge to theo-
rists of network-centric warfare. As
such, this work deserves to be read and
responded to by scholars and analysts
alike.
Network-centric warfare and its pre-
cepts, for better or worse, acknowl-
edged or not, are now embedded in
much of current thinking about mili-
tary operations in both the United
States and countries as diverse as the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Singapore,
and China. At the most basic level, pro-
ponents of NWCW urge strategists,
planners, operators, and even members
of the acquisition community to think
about war fighting in terms of nodes
and networks rather than of weapons
platforms. At its most simple, this
means that developing, sustaining, and
protecting connectivity (i.e., networks,
ranging from radios to fiber optics) is at
least as important as ships, tanks, air-
craft, satellites, and sensors. Everything
from combat power and combat effec-
tiveness to logistical efficiency is
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improved by taking full advantage of
the computer and telecommunications
advances made over the last half-
century. Friedman challenges NWCW
proponents by redefining their central
arguments about the relationship be-
tween nodes and networks. In effect, he
argues that the “picture” is more im-
portant than the network itself for con-
ducting military operations. The
network serves the development of ever
more complex and, presumably, accu-
rate “pictures” available to operators
and analysts.
If I have a problem with Friedman, it is
with his definition and explanation of
network-centric warfare, at least the
variant espoused by Vice Admiral
Cebrowski. (Full disclosure: Vice Admi-
ral Cebrowski was the president of the
Naval War College when I was hired
there, and I enjoyed more than a few
hours hashing out the intricacies of
network-centric warfare in his pres-
ence.) I do not agree that picture-
centric warfare is equivalent to
network-centric warfare: the “pictures”
highlighted by Friedman constitute
only one dimension (albeit an impor-
tant one) of the theory and practice of
network-centric warfare. Another rela-
tively minor quibble is that although
the book’s title refers to three world
wars, and indeed the narrative contains
analysis and examples from all
three—World War I, World War II,
and the Cold War—this is somewhat
misleading. As the table of contents
suggests, the real structure underlying
the work is instead three technological
eras, those associated with radios, radar,
and computers.
Network-centric Warfare is not an easy
read. It is filled with jargon and focuses
largely on relatively obscure develop-
ments. It is not a popular history or an
anecdote-filled volume designed to
thrill devotees of warfare. It lists nearly
fourteen pages of acronyms!
These complaints aside, this book is
worth buying, reading, and studying. It
is a most useful corrective to histories
focusing on specific wars, campaigns,




Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew
Campbell. Think Again: Why Good Leaders Make
Bad Decisions and How to Keep It from Happening
to You. Boston: Harvard Business School, 2008.
204pp. $27.95
Bad decisions are common, but bad de-
cisions by good leaders are perplexing.
This book delves into the root causes of
faulty decisions made by leaders who
should have known better. The reader
will be intrigued by the cognitive dy-
namics underlying defective decisions.
Neuroscience is making aspects of tra-
ditional wisdom about decision making
obsolete. It turns out that rational deci-
sion making is not really all that
rational.
The book’s lead author, Sydney
Finkelstein, teaches at Tuck School of
Business, Dartmouth, and has written ex-
tensively on leadership. His coauthors
both earned their MBAs at Harvard and
teach at the Strategic Management Center
at Ashridge Business School, outside Lon-
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